Closed Diplomatic Posts To Reopen Sunday

The State Department Spokesperson - and that awkward gender-neutral word "spokesperson" is indeed her official job title, although I'll be damned if I can see why it's any better than "spokeswoman" - Jen Psaki issued an update on the status of Embassies and Consulates this afternoon:

On Sunday, August 11, the Department of State will re-open 18 of the 19 embassies and consulates that were closed recently. Our embassy in Sanaa, Yemen will remain closed because of ongoing concerns about a threat stream indicating the potential for terrorist attacks emanating from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Our consulate in Lahore, Pakistan, which closed yesterday due to a separate credible threat to that facility, will also remain closed.

We will continue to evaluate the threats to Sanaa and Lahore and make subsequent decisions about the re-opening of those facilities based on that information. We will also continue to evaluate information about these and all of our posts and to take appropriate steps to best protect the safety of our personnel, American citizens traveling overseas, and visitors to our facilities.

And so, with no more explanation of the threats - or the threat streams to use another bit of annoying jargon - than when they were closed a week ago, 18 of the 19 affected NEA and AF posts will reopen.

As for Sanaa and Lahore, well, sometimes a cooling off period or a safety shutdown is a good idea. In fact, we probably should close those posts for no reason at all from time to time, just to be unpredictable and make our people a moving target.    

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The Deeper Meaning of the Number 27 (High Threat Posts)

Consumer Notice: This post is certified 100% free of Matters of Official Concern that are not referenced from publicly available sources of information.

Those lazy, hazy, crazy, days of summer (a good song, BTW) have rolled on for quite long enough, and it is now time that I take up something that has been bugging me for a few weeks - the State Department's clumsy post-Benghazi term of art, "high threat post."

The Department has used the term pretty extensively, but has never explained what it means, at least not in any public forum that I've seen. Official spokesman have said there are 27 high threat posts, but they have not indicated how or why those posts were selected. The Department hasn't even said which posts they are, although there have been at least two news media reports that named names and claimed official sources.

Confusion reigns, as Department employees try to reconcile the 27 posts that the news media has named with their danger pay or hardship differentials, their unaccompanied status or - more often - its lack, and the strange absence from the list of some posts that are indisputably high threat by any common meaning of the words. Beirut, for instance. None of it makes much sense.

Domani Spero has framed the question nicely: State Dept Now Has 27 High-Threat, High-Risk Posts — Are You In One of Them? That's a good question, and the Department hasn't yet provided any good answers. Has the Department even informed the staff at those 27 posts of their special status? I don't know.

As for exactly which 27 posts it is that are so special, here's what the news media tells us.

CBS News reported on December 8, 2012 (here) that the following posts are now under the purview of the new Deputy Assistant Secretary for High Threat Posts:

The scope of the expanded High Threat Unit has widened to include Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Libya, Mauritania, Niger, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen. Previously the only posts that fell under the High Threat designation were in Iraq and Afghanistan.

National Review On-Line reported on November 30, 2012 (here) that the mystery posts are:

The State Department said in an announcement that the new assistant secretary will be responsible for “evaluating, managing, and mitigating the security threats, as well as the direction of resource requirements at high threat diplomatic missions.” Those missions include American diplomatic facilities in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Libya, Mauritania, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen.

There are two minor inconsistencies between those lists. CBS listed Niger instead of Nigeria, and NRO listed Algeria but not Afghanistan. Putting that aside, just focus on the fact that both lists are of 17 countries. That's countries, or diplomatic missions, and not posts. The 17 countries have a total of 27 U.S. diplomatic posts between them (because Pakistan is one country but four posts, Nigeria has two posts, and so on).

So we have 27 posts that are of some special, but unspecified, security concern. If the 27 were referred to as "posts of special concern," or some such formulation, I think that meaning would be pretty clear. Unfortunately, the Department is referring to them as the "high threat posts," as in the name of the new office that will oversee them, and that naturally makes people assume the State Department has, literally, only 27 posts that are ranked High on its Security Environment Threat List. That assumption would be wrong.

Slight digression. The Security Environment Threat List has been described in multiple publicly available sources of information, such as this one by the General Accountability Office, so it's in the public sphere and may be mentioned by blogs such as mine. Here's how the GAO describes the SETL:

Diplomatic Security, in consultation with posts, other State bureaus, and other government agencies, uses these standards, called the Security Environment Threat List, to assign threat levels to each post. There are six threat categories: international terrorism, indigenous terrorism, political violence, crime, human intelligence, and technical threat. Each post is assigned one of four threat levels for each threat category. A post's threat level dictates what security measures should be in place. The levels are as follows:

• Critical: grave impact on American diplomats
• High: serious impact on American diplomats
• Medium: moderate impact on American diplomats
• Low: minor impact on American diplomats

If you think about the Security Environment Threat List, you might get even more confused by the term "high threat post." Are they the posts that are ranked High for all six categories of threat, or only for some categories? And what about the posts ranked Critical? Are they automatically included, as in high-threat-and-up posts? End digression.

Lately, I see official spokesmen have been referring to these 27 special posts as the "high threat / high risk" posts, which is a mouthful but also an improvement on the original term because it suggests that some kind of risk analysis went into the selection of those special posts.

The only public discussion I've seen of this matter was in the Senate Foreign Relations committee hearing of July 16, which featured testimony by the Acting Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, Gregory Starr, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for High Threat Posts, Bill Miller.



The hearing had low press interest, low attendance by committee members, and – maybe because of that – some uncommonly intelligent discussion about how the Department prioritizes its needs for new embassy construction, security upgrades, and security training. The entire hearing is worth listening to, but a ton of good sense and plain talk about risk management occurs between the 25 and 28 minute marks.

I noticed three particularly interesting things in the testimony of DAS Bill Miller:

• At the 1 hour 8 minute mark, he directly addressed the confusion over terminology. "High threat post," he said, is “a very often-used and not well-defined term," and he stressed that the 27 diplomatic posts which he oversees are not simply those that are rated high on the Security Environment Threat List.

• At the 19 minute mark, he testified that after the attacks of September, 2012, the Department selected certain posts for a higher level of security attention. “The Department weighed criteria to determine which posts are designated high threat / high risk, and there are now 27 posts which fall under this designation.” That statement appears on page 3 of his written testimony. He did not describe the selection criteria.

• At the 1 hour 6 minute mark, he gave a nice capsule description of the risk management process. The Department, he said, needs to constantly balance a host country's capability and willingness to provide security support to our missions with the local threats to those missions and the physical vulnerability of our mission facilities (for example, office buildings that are too flimsy to harden up against attack, or that are too close to surrounding streets, etc).

Considering the totality of DAS Miller's testimony, I think we can see how the 27 posts were selected. Their particular combinations of the big three risk factors - weak or unreliable host country support, high security threats, and physical vulnerabilities to those threats - made them stand out as Diplomatic Security's top tier of concern. Neither DAS Miller nor any other official spokesman has said that in so many words, but if one did, I would be satisfied with that explanation.

Assuming I am interpreting this correctly, a diplomatic mission could have one, or two, or even all three of those risk factors to varying degrees, and that wouldn't necessarily make it an official High Threat Post. But if a post has all three of those things to an exceptionally high degree, then it has won the trifecta of suckiness and gets to be an HTP.

If that's not a good enough explanation of the deeper meaning of the number 27, then I have some more. It's the only number that's a perfect cube (3 to the 3rd power). There are 27 amendments to the U.S. Constitution. It was the age at which Jimi Hendrix, Janis Joplin, Jim Morrison, Kurt Cobain, and Amy Winehouse all died. And there was that movie about 27 dresses.

But I think I'm right about the Trifecta of Suckiness theory. As I was typing this post this evening, I clicked on a press release about an appropriations bill introduced today to authorize next year's funding for Department of State operations and embassy security. Lo and behold, it includes a section requiring the Department to identify its high threat posts, and defines that term as follows:

The term 'high risk, high threat post' means a United States diplomatic or consular post, as determined by the Secretary, that, among other factors, is -

(A) located in a country with (i) high to critical levels of political violence and terrorism; and (ii) the government of which lacks the ability or willingness to provide adequate security; and,

(B) with mission physical security platforms that fall below the Department of state's established standards.

Ah, ha! The same big three risk factors that featured in DAS Miller's testimony before the SFRC. If that section makes it into the final bill, then next year we'll have an official notification of exactly which posts are HTPs and why.

Until then, if you are serving at a post that is experiencing pervasive suckiness of an exceptionally high degree, then you just might be at an HTP.

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Most Eyebrow-Raising Headline Of The Week

 "Fans kill and quarter football referee in Brazil" (AP)

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My Favorite Government Institution Is 238 Years Old Today

Established by resolution of the Continental Congress on June 14, 1775:

Resolved, That six companies of expert rifflemen, be immediately raised in Pensylvania, two in Maryland, and two in Virginia; that each company consist of a captain, three lieutenants, four serjeants, four corporals, a drummer or trumpeter, and sixty-eight privates.

That each company, as soon as compleated, shall march and join the army near Boston, to be there employed as light infantry, under the command of the chief Officer in that army.

My hat is off to all the "brave, healthy, able bodied, and well disposed" young men and women who have enlisted "for the defense of the Liberties and Independence of the United States" since that day.

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ARB Benghazi: Quick Comment, Part 4

That's a nice wave

Consumer Notice: This post is certified 100% free of Matters of Official Concern that are not referenced from publicly available sources of information.

In Part 3, I quoted a GAO report to note some of the practical limitations that prevent most of the Department's overseas office facilities from fully meeting security standards. In this post, I'll cite the Foreign Affairs Manual to the effect that certain types of overseas facilities are not required to fully meet security standards or to obtain waivers of unmet standards.

Now, to track down the Department's actual requirements for overseas facilities security and waivers thereof, you have to go deep into a Dork Forest of official paperwork and policy geek language. Misunderstandings are common, and one of those misunderstandings concerns the Special Mission in Benghazi. It did not 'meet standards.' But did those standards apply in the first place, and did the Mission need a waiver of unmet standards?

The written statement of former RSO Tripoli Eric Nordstrom to the House Oversight Committee concerning security measures taken and not taken in Benghazi (here) contains this key passage:

SECCA [the Secure Embassy and Counterterrorism Act] establishes statutory security requirements for U.S. diplomatic facilities involving collocation and setback. Under SECCA, the State Department, in selecting a site for any new U.S. diplomatic facility abroad, must collocate all U.S. Government personnel at the post on the site. Each newly acquired U.S. diplomatic facility must be placed not less than 100 feet from the perimeter of the property. New U.S. chancery/consulate buildings, solely or substantially occupied by the U.S. Government, must meet collocation and 100-foot setback statutory requirements; otherwise, waivers to the statutory requirements must be granted by the Secretary of State. Furthermore, in accordance with 12 FAM 315.5, the Secretary {of State} must notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing of any waiver with respect to a chancery or consulate building and the reasons for the determination, not less than 15 days prior to implementing a statutory collocation or setback waiver.

The requirement for a waiver might seem clear - it was required by law, and Hillary Clinton herself had to have signed it - but the key phrase is "U.S. chancery/consulate buildings." What exactly qualifies as a chancery or consulate?

All policy language is subject to definition. The first thing the FAM says about the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act is in 12 FAM 313. Note paragraph b:

12 FAM 313 SECURE EMBASSY CONSTRUCTION AND COUNTERTERRORISM ACT (SECCA)

a. SECCA establishes statutory security requirements for U.S. diplomatic facilities involving collocation and setback. (1) Site Selection (Collocation): The State Department, in selecting a site for any new U.S. diplomatic facility abroad, must collocate all U.S. Government personnel at the post (except those under the command of an area military commander) on the site.

(2) Perimeter Distance (Setback): Each newly acquired U.S. diplomatic facility must be sited not less than 100 feet (30.48 m) from the perimeter of the property on which the facility is situated.

b. U.S. diplomatic facilities are defined for purposes of the SECCA to include any chancery, consulate, or other office notified to the host government as diplomatic or consular premises in accordance with the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations. It also includes offices subject to a publicly available bilateral agreement with the host government that recognizes the official status of the U.S. Government personnel present in the facility.

So for the purpose of applying SECCA, a "U.S. diplomatic facility" is an office that is notified to the host government, or is the subject of a publicly available bilateral agreement. Full stop.

The question then becomes: was the Special Mission in Benghazi so notified to the host government? If the answer to that question is yes, then it needed a waiver. If the answer is no, then it did not.

The Benghazi ARB report said the Mission was never formally notified to the Libyan government:

Although the TNC [Transitional National Counsel] declared that Tripoli would continue to be the capital of a post-Qaddafi Libya, many of the influential players in the TNC remained based in Benghazi. Stevens continued as Special Envoy to the TNC in Benghazi until he departed Libya on November 17, 2011, after which the Special Envoy position was not filled. Stevens was replaced by an experienced Civil Service employee who served for 73 days in what came to be called the “principal officer” position in Benghazi. After November 2011, the principal officer slot became a TDY assignment for officers with varying levels of experience who served in Benghazi anywhere from 10 days to over two months, usually without transiting Tripoli. In December 2011, the Under Secretary for Management approved a one-year continuation of the U.S. Special Mission in Benghazi, which was never a consulate and never formally notified to the Libyan government.

Assuming the ARB report is correct on that point, there was never a need for a waiver of security standards for the Special Mission in Benghazi. Therefore, various Congressmen can stop wasting their time in a futile hunt for that smoking gun in Hillary's hands.

They are in hot pursuit of it now. Here's Rep. James Lankford questioning Eric Nordstrom on May 8, at the second Oversight Committee hearing on Benghazi:




The key exchange is:

(Lankford): "By statute, Mr. Nordstrom, who has authority to place personnel in a facility that does not meet the minimum OSPB [Overseas Security Policy Board] standards?"

(Nordstrom): "The OSPB standards go in tandem with SECCA, which is the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act, both of which derived out of the East Africa bombings, or were strengthened after that. It's my understanding that since we were the sole occupants of both of those facilities - Benghazi and Tripoli - the only person who could grant waivers or exceptions to those was the Secretary of State."

And with that, the hunt is on for the blockbuster withheld waiver memo that is assumed to exist.

I haven't seen the Department issue a statement of its own, separate from the ARB report, to clarify the status of the Special Mission in regard to SECCA's standards and waiver requirements. There are plenty of policy analysts and legal advisers in the building who could give Congress a definitive opinion, and the Department spokesmen would be well advised to use them.

The entire matter of Benghazi and its aftermath are traumatic enough already, and I'd hate to see people get even more emotionally invested in a waiver memo that doesn't exist.

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Google Versus Bing, Memorial Day 2013

As per usual, Google did a little tiny ribbon for Memorial Day instead of one of its trademark Google Doodles.

I suppose if I were one of Google's indentured high-tech servants making less than the prevailing U.S. wage (thanks, Congress) I wouldn't put any effort into the occasion, either.














Bing, also as usual, has an appropriate background image.

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Benghazi ARB Follow-Up: Quick Comment, Part 3

Just waiting for a security upgrade

Consumer Notice: This post is certified 100% free of Matters of Official Concern that are not referenced from publicly available sources of information.

In Part 2, I referred to the difficultly of upgrading the security of temporary, and/or hastily acquired, facilities. I also cited Undersecretary for Management Patrick Kennedy (here) saying that at least half of the State Department's overseas office buildings fail to fully meet the standards established by the Overseas Security Policy Board.

Why is it so hard to upgrade those buildings until they meet standards? Is it insufficient funding? Lack of will? Total bureaucratic indifference? Technical incompetence?

Opinions about all of that will differ, but anyone who has actually tried to upgrade the security of one of those buildings has realized the inherent limitations of conventionally constructed buildings - that is, of the normal kinds of office and residential buildings that you find the world over. Unless and until you build a building to suit yourself, i.e., a Fortress Embassy, you will have to settle for something less than fully satisfactory.

The situation was explained very well in a General Accountability Office report from 2008, GAO-08-162, which was succinctly entitled "Embassy Security: Upgrades Have Enhanced Security, but Site Conditions Prevent Full Adherence to Standards." A few quotes from that report will do:

At the 11 posts we visited with ongoing or completed CSUP [Compound Security Upgrade Program] projects, we found that the projects had enhanced posts' compliance with State's physical security standards as detailed in the "Foreign Affairs Handbook" and "Foreign Affairs Manual." The projects we viewed added or enhanced pedestrian and vehicle access points, replaced perimeter fencing to meet anti-climb requirements, installed bollards and barriers at key points to meet anti-ram requirements, built safe areas for post officials in case of attack, enhanced the hard line separating post employees from visitors, and installed forced entry/ballistic-resistant windows and doors.

Nevertheless, without building a new facility, many posts are unable to meet all security standards for a variety of reasons beyond the scope of CSUP. We found that none of the posts we visited adhered fully with current security standards because of conditions that were outside the scope of CSUP projects. For example, most of the posts we visited were located in dense urban areas that prevented them from achieving a 100-foot setback from the street, one of the key security standards. OBO [Overseas Buildings Operations] and DS [Diplomatic Security] officials acknowledged that, at many locations, it is not feasible to increase the setback by acquiring land and closing off nearby streets. In other cases, officials stated the buildings themselves were not structurally capable of handling heavy forced entry/ballistic-resistant windows or other upgrades. And in other cases, officials commented that host nations or cities would not allow certain upgrades to be implemented, such as removing trees to create a clear zone around the embassy or changing the facade of historic buildings.

That's about the size of it. The U.S. government occupies hundreds of office buildings overseas, and has done so since the 1800s. Despite the pace of new embassy construction, which kicked into high gear only in 2000, many of the buildings we occupy today were acquired long before we had any type of security standards. We can upgrade them to a greater or lesser degree but can't make them Fortresses retroactively, for all the reasons the GAO noted - locations that lack significant setback distance from public streets, structures that can't support the weight of serious physical barriers, and host governments that won't permit certain changes.

The most serious of these reasons is structural limitation, which means that you can't add more weight to a building than its load-bearing structure will allow. The structural limitations of the typical building that you can acquire overseas might not be obvious, but trust me, adding Fortress-level amounts of concrete or steel to it isn't an option. (By the way, an excellent general-interest primer on this topic is Why Buildings Stand Up: The Strength of Architecture, in case you are really motivated to read into the subject.)

You can try this yourself at home. Steel plate of a useful thickness weighs 10 pounds per square foot, the forced entry/ballistic-resistant doors used in Fortress Embassies weight almost 1,000 pounds each, and equivalent windows weigh 44 pounds per square foot. (I take that information from the brochure of a company that sells Department-certified security products.) Call a building contractor and ask what it would take to plate your house in steel and replace the doors and windows with forced-entry/ballistic resistant ones.

Unless you live in something made of reinforced concrete, you'll probably find it isn't feasible. And in that event, you would most likely settle for something less. The U.S. government does the same.

I'll have one last quick comment in response to the Benghazi ARB, to be posted sometime this Memorial Day weekend.

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